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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE NO-CONTACT
ORDERS AND THE AUTONOMY RIGHTS
OF VICTIMS
She sat in the first row, her children by her side. She was easy to
pick out of the crowded courtroom. In part, because the regulars—the
probation officers, the interpreters, the victims' advocates, the daily
courtroom watchers—of the Rhode Island Superior Court are easily
recognizable. Also, although she wasn't keeping an eye out for her
lawyer—she didn't have a lawyer—she nervously watched everything
and everyone, sure that someone would ask her to leave. She wore her
best outfit and kept the kids quiet and still, showing proper respect.
When her name was read there was the moment of hesitation seen
time and again in the courtroom. Should she stand up? Go through
the gate, into the inner sanctum where the judge sat? As she half-stood,
looking for a signal from someone—a uniform, a suit, a robe—who
knew what she was supposed to do, she heard the judge ask the
prosecutor for a recommendation. Without looking up, the prosecutor
indicated that the Attorney General's office would recommend denial.
She didn't know the woman speaking, had never met her.
Before she had managed to straighten her skirt, the judge an-
nounced, "Motion dismissed," and turned to the next file. She looked
around the room for a clue, for someone to tell her what had just
happened. The sheriff approached her, knowing, as the regulars did,
why she was there. He explained that her application to withdraw the
no-contact order issued against her husband had been denied. "Maybe
you should try again in three months?"
"But I didn't get to talk, I didn't get to tell them . . . who is she to
decide . . . they never asked me why."
Scenes such as this can be witnessed several times a week in many
courtrooms of the United States. In Rhode Island, the state decided
what was best for this woman and her family without giving her an
opportunity to be heard. Rhode Island is not alone in this approach;
many other states, in the wake of growing public awareness, have
developed similar statutes and policies to prosecute domestic violence
offenses. It has taken more than twenty years to criminalize conduct
that the criminal justice system has traditionally treated as an untouch-
able, "private" family matter. Today, strong anti-domestic violence laws
and policies are in place and functioning, albeit to varying degrees,
throughout the country. These laws are primarily intended to protect
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individuals and society as a whole from the effects of domestic violence.
Unfortunately, they have also tended to remove the victim from par-
ticipating in essential decisions concerning her family, its structure and
the prospects for resolution within the family. It may now be time to
give the victim back her voice. In order to explore ways to reintroduce
the victim's preferences into domestic violence jurisprudence, Part I
of this Note will review the development of modern domestic violence
law.' Part II will examine the personal and private autonomy rights at
stake in domestic violence cases, as well as the constitutional decisions
and tests that protect these rights. 2 Part III will propose a first step
towards reinstating the victim and her wishes into the process.' To this
end, the Note will focus on the current use of criminal protection or-
ders—known as no-contact orders—by prosecutors and courts. More-
over, it will examine how the victim's wishes can be integrated into
these decisions in the future :1
 The procedural hearing in which the
no-contact order is typically imposed, pre-trial release, provides an
ideal setting in which to balance the State's interest in addressing
crimes of domestic violence and the private autonomy interests of the
victim.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW
Until relatively recently, the criminal justice system had not aggres-
sively pursued violence between domestic partners. 5 Not until the
1970s did the public perception of battered women and their abusive
partners begin to change significantly. 6 With heightened public aware-
ness, pressure to change the criminal justice system increased and the
system began to respond.? As domestic violence became recognized as
a societal and public safety issue, the need for legal intervention be-
t See infra notes 5-100 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 101-55 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 156-228 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 211-28 and accompanying text.
5 See generally Pamela Blass Bracher, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: The City of
Cincinnati's Simple Solution to a Complex Problem, 65 U. Cur. L. REV. 155,160-63 (1996); Angela
Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or
Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. Rev. 853,853-55 (1994); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose:
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV, L. REv. 1849, 1857-58
(1996) [hereinafter No Right to Choose]; Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to
Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 267-68 (1985).
6 See Waits, supra note 5, at 267-68.
7 See id. at 268.
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came apparent, resulting in domestic violence legislation on both the
state and federal levels. 8
Both English and American law historically condoned wife beat-
ing:4 The earliest reported case of a woman charging her husband in
court for domestic violence is a fourteenth-century English case, Neffeld
v. Neffeld.") The court, yielding to English common law—which treated
married women as adjuncts of their husbands with no independent
legal identity or status—denied the woman relief and sent her back to
her marital home." Following the English tradition, American women
were denied independent legal identities until the early part of the
twentieth century." State laws legalizing wife beating were prevalent
throughout the United States." Not until 1920 did all states remove
laws permitting, or enact laws prohibiting, wife beating." Another fifty
years would pass, however, before the criminal justice system would
abandon nonintervention policies, such as non-arrest policies, and
begin treating domestic violence as a serious crime."
Historically, both social norms and limits to legal authority typi-
cally resulted in nonintervention and non-arrest policies in police
departments throughout the country." Domestic violence calls were
assigned a low response priority, and mediation attempts by respond-
ing officers were encouraged while actual arrests were discouraged."
8 See generally Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV, 1505, 1516 (1998) [hereinafter Paradox of Hope); No Right to
Choose, supra note 5, at 1859-60.
9 See Bracher, supra note 5, at 160.
10 See Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and
Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 171, 184 (1994).
" See Del Martin, The Historical Roots of Domestic Violence, in. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 3, 6 (Daniel .). Sonkin, ed., 1987)
(attributing to William Blackstone "ibly marriage the husband and wife are one person in law;
that the very being or legal existence of woman is suspended in marriage.").
12 See id. at 6.
15 See id. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in 1824, ruled that a husband can beat his wife in
"cases of emergency." See id, at 6. Laws allowing husbands to hit their wives with "a switch no
bigger than his thumb" were enacted in most states during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. See id. Even as the North Carolina Court, in 1874, held that a husband could never
chastise his wife, it went on to say that unless permanent injury had been inflicted upon the wife,
the matter was not of public concern. See id.
See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1857.
15 see id.
18 See id. at 1859; Bracher, supra note 5, at 161.
" See Bracher, supra note 5, at 161; see also Response from the Criminal Justice System (visited
Nov. 7, 1998) <http://horne.c-ybergirl.com/dvistatistatcritn.html >, citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Violence Against Women: A National Crime Victimization Survey
Report, 9 (1994) (finding that police were more likely to respond within five minutes if the
offender was a stranger than if an offender was known to the female victim).
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Separating the parties was often the extent of police intervention. This
included removing either the abuser or the victim from the home and
informing the victim of the ramifications of arrest—loss of income,
court costs and public testimony."
Successful court challenges and the accompanying publicity insti-
gated changes in police policies and led to legislative responses on
both the state and federal level. 19 In 1977, in Bruno v. Codd, one of the
earliest challenges was launched in a suit against the New York City
Police Department and the New York Family Court." The plaintiffs
claimed that police officers had failed to take action against abusive
spouses even when evidence of assault was unmistakable. 21 Instead, the
officers would advise a victim that she could not act when her abuser
was her spouse and that her only remedy was to obtain an order of
protection from the Family Court. 22 The Family Court failed to ad-
vise the battered wives of their statutory right to petition immediately
for such orders, instead assigning the women conference dates often
weeks or months in the future." The New York Supreme Court found
that the police failed to perform their duty to protect battered wives
as they would any other similarly situated citizen by pursuing a discrimi-
natory police policy." The court also found that the Family Court failed
to fulfill its statutory duties and responsibilities, showing a callous
disregard for women in need of immediate protection from their
abusive husbands." The trial court, in denying the police department's
motion to dismiss, stated:
[f] or too long, Anglo-American law treated a man's physical
abuse of his wife as different from any other assault, and,
18 See Bracher, supra note 5, at 161.
19 See id. at 163-65, citing Scott v. Hart, No. C-762395 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 28, 1976). In a
class action suit against the Chief of Police of Oakland, California for failure to respond or
ineffectual response to domestic violence calls which was settled out of court, the settlement gave
the plaintiffs most of the relief they sought including an agreement to: (1) quicken response to
domestic violence calls; (2) arrest whenever probable cause was found; and (3) prohibit the use
of adverse consequences to pressure victims to drop charges. See id
28 See Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977), Iry d, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y.
1979).
21 See id. at 976. In one case, the police arrived after a husband had beaten his wife and
"brandished a straight razor ... tore [the victim's] blouse off [her] body and gouged [her] face,
neck, shoulders and hands with his nails, in full public view." Id. The police advised the woman
that they could do nothing since it was a family matter. See id.
" See id.
"See Bruno, 396 N.Y.S. at 976, 978.
24 See id. at 977.
Yb See id. at 979.
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indeed, as an acceptable practice. If the allegations of the
instant complaint—buttressed by hundreds of pages of affi-
davits—are true, only the written law has changed; in reality,
a wife beating is still condoned, if not approved, by some of
those charged with protecting its victims."
Following the denial of its motion to dismiss, the New York Police
Department entered into a consent decree with the plaintiffs." The
consent decree provided for changes in police policies to improve
response time and arrest rates of domestic violence complaints. 28
The New York Court of Appeals dismissed the charges against the
New York Family Court after procedural changes were announced. 29
These changes, later backed by a legislative amendment to the
Family Court Act, required court clerks to advise battered women
of their rights to an immediate protective order hearing before a
judge.5°
In 1984, in Thurman v. City of Torrington, a federal jury in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut awarded
the plaintiff, a battered wife, $2.3 million on the grounds that the
Torrington police were negligent in their failure to protect her from
her abusive spouse. 31 The court held the police department liable for
its non-arrest policy in domestic violence cases, reasoning that the
policy was, in effect, sexual discrimination. As a result, police depart-
ments and legislatures throughout the United States, concerned about
similar lawsuits and liabilities, began to replace non-arrest and nonin-
tervention policies with more aggressive policies. 52 The first step for
many jurisdictions was to provide police officers with the legal authority
26 Id. at 975-76 (internal citations omitted).
27 See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 46,58-59 (1992).
" See id.
" See id at 58.
10 See id.
!I See 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Zorza, supra note 27, at 60. The plaintiff, Tracey
Thurman, alleging that her constitutional rights had been violated when police failed to act on
reported threats and assaults by her husband, filed a civil action against the City of Torrington
and its police officials. See Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524. Ms. Thurman notified the police of
repeated threats made by her husband. See id. When, on June 10,1983, Ms. Thurman contacted
police again, it took over 25 minutes for a single officer to arrive. See id. at 1525. She had been
stabbed in the neck, chest and throat. See id. Her husband continued to beat her in spite of the
presence of the police officer; the officer did not intervene. See id. at 1526. More officers arrived
on the scene yet no attempt was made to prevent Mr. Thurman from his continued abuse. See
Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524. Police arrested Mr. Thurman only after he threateningly ap-
proached his wife while she was laying on a stretcher. See id.
32 See Bracher, supra note 5, at 165; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1858.
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to arrest at the scene of a domestic assault." Previously, unless a mis-
demeanor occurred in the officer's presence or the officer could es-
tablish probable cause that a felony had taken place, the officer legally
could not make a warrantless arrest. 34 When, in 1984, the United States
Attorney General recommended arrest as the standard police policy
for domestic violence cases, legal reform efforts were initiated nation-
wide 55 Based on this recommendation, all fifty states now provide for
warrantless arrests, by making an exception to the in-presence require-
ment when an officer has probable cause to believe that a misde-
meanor has been committed or a restraining order has been violated."
These statutes can vary in the amount of discretion accorded to the
police officer: (1) permissive arrest statutes afford police officers con-
siderable discretion; (2) preferential arrest statutes limit police discre-
tion; and (3) mandatory arrest statutes completely restrict police dis-
cretion.57 Currently, most states have implemented either preferential
or mandatory arrest statutes." Although the underlying aim of these
statutes is to remove institutional resistance to arrest by the police, the
statutes also remove the victim as the decisionmaker.
With stronger arrest policies in place, and-domestic violence ad-
vocates next turned their attention to reform of prosecution prac-
tices.59
 Like other members of the criminal justice system, prosecutors
historically considered domestic violence a private crime and thus, for
the most part, failed to initiate or follow through on charges. 4° In
addition, victim noncooperation and reluctance or refusal to partici-
pate were cited as reasons for not pursuing charges." If victims made
their reluctance known, prosecutors were likely to dispose of the cases
33 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1859.
34 See id
35 See id. at 1859 n.32, citing ATTORNEY GEN.'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL
REPORT 22-23 (1984).
36 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1859.
37 See Bracher, supra note 5, at 166, 168-69, 170; Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1518-19,
1520.
38 See Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1519 & n.47. Preferred arrest statutes are generally
worded "should arrest," encouraging but not requiring officers to arrest when probable cause is
encountered. See id. at 1519 n.47. In contrast, jurisdictions following mandatory arrest policies
have "shall arrest" within the statutory language. See id.
39
 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1860.
40 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 866. Although prosecutors are given "great latitude and little
accountability" in deciding whether to forgo or proceed in domestic violence cases, they remain
reluctant to proceed with domestic violence cases. See id. at 866-67. Prosecutors remain hampered
by a complex set of motivations (such as maintaining conviction rates) and beliefs that the
violence is inconsequential, victims are to blame or that harm does not reach societal proportions.
See ki. at 867.
41
 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1860. Sometimes charges were dropped solely on
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by dropping the charges.° Approximately fifty to eighty percent of
cases, depending on the jurisdiction, were thus disposed.' Many juris-
dictions responded to this situation by limiting or removing the prose-
cutor's discretion when deciding whether to proceed with a case.'"
The most aggressive prosecution policies are those of mandatory
prosecution. Mandatory prosecution policies, also referred to as no-
drop policies, are intended to check prosecutorial discretion. Under a
no-drop policy, a prosecutor cannot routinely dismiss charges at the
victim's request, but rather must pursue the case and elicit the victim's
cooperation.45 These policies represent both the intent of the state to
pursue domestic violence cases and the protocol by which to do so,
despite nonparticipation by the victim." No-drop policies underscore
that the state, and not the victim, is the party to the prosecution. 47 For
example, Rhode Island state law imposes a duty on the court to "make
clear to the defendant and the victim that the prosecution of the
domestic violence action is determined by the prosecutor and not the
victim."' If after charges have been filed the victim indicates that she
will not support the prosecution, the no-drop policy directs prosecutors
to (1) continue, notwithstanding the victim's reluctance; (2) convey
to the victim that the state controls the case; and (3) facilitate victim
participation in the prosecution. 49 Several perceived benefits have been
the prosecutor's expectation that the victim would ultimately change her mind. See Corsilles,
supra note 5, at 867. It continues to be difficult to determine the extent to which victims are
influenced by the prosecutor's reluctance to move forward. See id. Prosecutors have discouraged
victims by: (1) conveying disbelief; (2) actively outlining the disadvantages of pursuing the
charges; (3) delaying the institution of charges; and (4) abdicating control for dismissing the
case to the victim. See id. at 868-69. Many victims, discouraged by the legal process, may then
decide that the cost of proceeding with the prosecution outweighs the potential benefits. See id.
at 870; see also Donna Wills, Domestic Violence . The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 173, 173-74 (1997) (stating that, because the victim will often decline to press
charges, prosecutors cannot rely on the victim of domestic violence to vindicate the Slate's
interests in domestic violence cases).
42 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 857.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 874; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1861-62.
43 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 859; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1862.
46 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 858; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1862-63.
47 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 858; see also Wills, supra note 41, at 173 (asserting that the
prosecutor's client is the State, not the victim).
49 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-4(b) (4) (1997).
49 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 859. Viewing mandated participation as a better choice than
dismissal when encountering an uncooperative witness, Professor Hanna acknowledges that a
woman's sense of autonomy is threatened by the compromise. See No Right to Choose, supra note
5, at 1856. Forcing the witness to take the stand may be avoided if the prosecutors gather enough
outside evidence. See id. at 1867. Participation must be mandated, however, if necessary to
proceed with the case. See id. at 1857. Professor Hanna states that "the societal benefits gained
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attributed to proceeding with the prosecution with or without the
victim's cooperation. Among these are reductions in the dismissal
rates, increased victim cooperation and minimization of the victim's
value to the batterer as an ally in no-drop jurisdictions. 50 There are also
recognized drawbacks to these policies. When compelled against her
will to participate in a proceeding, the victim's right to self-determina-
tion is yet again subjugated—this time to the prosecutor. 51 The decision
whether to prosecute could be the victim's opportunity to take a
proactive step toward removing violence in her life and taking control
in a relationship in which she previously was powerless.52 A policy which
mandates the removal of this opportunity and instead replaces one
domination with another may drive the reluctant victim to side with
her battering partner, further entrenching her in the abusive relation-
ship."
Pro-prosecution policies, whether they are no-drop policies or less
stringent approaches to limiting prosecutorial discretion, vary greatly
among jurisdictions. 54 At the federal level, the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994 ("VAWA") attempts to provide a multifaceted national re-
sponse to the issues of domestic violence, including extensive funding
to states establishing pro-prosecution policies. 55 Recently the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, found one provision of VAWA, which provided for
a private cause of action against perpetrators of violence motivated by
gender, to exceed Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 56 The court
did not examine any other provision of the act. 57 Provisions authorizing
through this criminal justice response to domestic violence far outweighs short-term costs to
women's autonomy and collective safety." Id. When aggressive policies mandate prosecution, the
incentive for the batterer to manipulate or coerce the victim is minimized since she no longer
controls the process. See id. at 1865. Suggesting that mandated participation continue through
the life of the case, Professor Hanna would require the woman to sign statements, be photo-
graphed to document injuries, produce her children if subpoenaed, appear in court and, if
necessary, be forced to testify. See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1867. Since 90% to 95% of
cases end in plea bargains, instances of forced testimony would be rare. See id.
55 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 873-74; Wills, supra note 41, at 180.
51 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1865-66; Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A
New Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA
WostEres L.J. 183,191 (1997).
53 See Mills, supra note 51, at 191.
53 See id. at 190-91.
54 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 859-60; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1864.
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 10410(a) (2) (E) (1998).
56 See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., Nos. 96-1814,96-2316,1999 WL 111891, at *2
(4th Cir. 1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (establishing a federal substantive right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by gender" and a tort action allowing compensatory and/or
punitive damages and injunctive, declaratory or other appropriate relict).
57 See Brzonkala, 1999 WL 111891, at *2.
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federal grants to fund state domestic violence coalitions, which further
the purpose of domestic violence intervention and prevention through
activities such as "the adoption of aggressive and vertical prosecution
policies," have not been challenged and remain in effect.° Further-
more, the federal government continues to make available "model
state leadership grants" to ten states with statewide policies that "auth-
orize and encourage prosecutors to pursue cases where a criminal case
can be proved, including proceeding without the active involvement
of the victim if necessary; and . . . implement model projects that
include . . . a 'no-drop' prosecution policy." 59
In addition, four states have passed legislation favoring either
pro-prosecution or mandatory prosecution policies in domestic vio-
lence cases, but the nuances of these laws vary by state.60 Florida law
mandates criminal prosecution as the "favored method" for enforcing
domestic violence injunctions and requires each circuit to "adopt a
pro-prosecution policy for acts of domestic violence. "6i Utah law also
encourages the adoption of no-drop policies and specifically disallows
dismissal by the prosecutor or judge at the victim's request, unless
there is "reasonable cause" to think that the victim would "benefit." 62
Wisconsin's statute directs all district attorneys' offices to "develop,
adopt and implement written policies" that are not based on the
victim's consent to prosecute. 65 Minnesota, adopting a different ap-
proach, requires city and county attorneys to develop and implement
a plan to expedite and improve the efficiency of domestic abuse cases,
including methods for gathering evidence exclusive of the victim's
testimony.°
Furthermore, some municipalities have implemented pro-prose-
cution policies, either as written protocols or through unwritten office
68 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 10410(a)(2)(E) (1998).
" 42 U.S.C. § 10415 (b) (3) (A)-(B) (1998). States that have implemented a "vertical prosecu-
don" policy may also qualify for the grants. See id. Under vertical prosecution policies, a special-
ized prosecutor or prosecution unit is assigned the case after arraignment and stays with the case
through its completion. See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1910.
62 See, e.g., FIA. STAT. ch. 741.2901(2) (1997); MINN. STAT. § 611A.0311(b)(4) (1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7 (1998); Wm. STAT. § 968.075(7) (1997).
61 FLA. STAT. ch. 741.2901(2). In addition, the statute requires each state attorney to develop
specialized units or prosecutors for domestic violence cases. See id. ch. 741.2901(1),
62 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(1) (e) (1998).
" See WM. STAT. § 968.075(7) (1997). In addition, the prosecutor cannot decide against
prosecution because of an absence of visible injury or because of the relationship of the persons
involved in the incident. See id. § 968.075(7) (a) (1, 3). The statute also calls for an annual report
indicating the number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions by each district attorney. See id.
§ 968.075(9).
" See MINN. STAT. § 611A.0311(1) (b) (1997). The plan must also address the following: early
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practices.65 These policies tend to focus on obtaining victim participa-
tion, often resorting to issuing subpoenas to victims 66 Although some
municipal policies allow victims to drop charges after meeting certain
criteria,67 others are more stringent, with some even approaching man-
dated victim participation.° Both San Diego, California and Duluth,
Minnesota city attorneys issue subpoenas to elicit victim participation.°
Similarly, in 1983, under an Anchorage, Alaska no-drop policy, a victim
who had filed a complaint and then changed her mind was jailed
overnight for refusal to cooperate." The victim was released when her
husband agreed to probation and counseling." Mandated participa-
tion policies such as those above have been criticized as being invasive
and substantially infringing upon the victim's autonomy. 72 Advocates
of mandatory participation, however, believe that it is a better choice
than dismissal when encountering an uncooperative witness." They
argue that the societal benefits of prosecuting abusers outweigh the
short-term costs to women's autonomy and collective safety."
A substantially less invasive tactic for confronting domestic vio-
lence is the mandatory no-contact order. In most jurisdictions, a crimi-
nal protection order, also known as a criminal no-contact order, is
issued as a condition of a pretrial release or sentencing when a domes-
assignment of trial prosecutor; procedures to facilitate early contact between the prosecutor and
victim in order to acquaint the victim with the process, including her role as a witness for the
prosecution; procedures to encourage the prosecution of all domestic abuse cases where a crime
can be proven; and the use of subpoenas to victims. See id. § 611A.0311(1) (b) (1, 2, 4, 7).
so See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 859-62.
66 See id. at 860.
61 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1863-64. In Alexandria, Virginia, a victim can drop
charges after appearing before a judge to explain her refusal. See a Although the charges will
not be automatically dismissed when a victim changes her mind, the no-drop policy of Jefferson
County, Kentucky, allows the prosecution to dismiss, with the county's domestic violence unit's
consent, once the prosecutor has obtained a sworn statement from the victim explaining her
reasons for withdrawing. See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 860. A victim will be allowed to sign a "drop
form" in Marion County, Indiana, as long as she has contacted her legal advocate and has been
advised of the risk of being revictitnized if the charges are dropped. See id. at 861.
62 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 860, 862; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1866.
69 See Corsilles, supra note 5, at 860, 862. The official policy of the San Diego City Attorney
is to issue an arrest warrant, at the request of a specially trained domestic violence prosecutor, if
a subpoenaed victim fails to show and the case cannot proceed without her. See id. at 860. All
victims, irrespective of their willingness to testify, are subpoenaed in Duluth in an effort to shield
the victim from the appearance of responsibility. See id. at 862.
7° See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1866 & n.76, citing John Riley, Spouse-Abuse Victim
Jailed After No-Drop Policy Invoked, NAT'L Lj., Aug. 22, 1983, at 4.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 1856, 1870.
" See id. at 1856.
74 See id. at 1857.
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tic violence arrest has been made. 75 A court issues a criminal no-contact
order as part of another criminal proceeding, such as bail determina-
tion, with the state acting as a party. 76 No-contact orders typically pro-
hibit the defendant from directly or indirectly contacting the victim
and from returning to or approaching the home or any other location
where the victim is likely to be found. 77 The discretion accorded to the
court with respect to the issuance of a criminal protection order,
including which conditions to stipulate, varies by jurisdiction. 78
The governing statutes of several states require that a no-contact
order be issued as a condition of pretrial release, thus limiting the
opportunity for victim input. 79 For example, the Rhode Island statute
mandates that the court impose a no-contact order, providing that:
[b] ecause of the likelihood of repeated violence directed at
those who have been victims of domestic violence in the past,
when a person is charged with or arrested for a crime involv-
ing domestic violence, that person may not be released from
custody on bail ... without first appearing before the court
... Mlle court . . . shall issue a no-contact order prohibiting
the person charged or arrested from having contact with the
victitn.81)
By the same token, Colorado, in mandating the issuance of restrain-
ing orders against domestic violence defendants, requires that the
order be issued immediately, upon first appearance before the
court, and continue until final disposition of the action." Similarly,
both South Dakota and Utah also mandate a no-contact order
whenever bond is set in domestic violence cases." Although these
statutes are meant to protect victims from ongoing battering, they
75 See Christopher R. Frank, Criminal Protection Orders in Domestic Violence Cases: Getting Rid
of Rats with Snakes, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919, 922 (1996).
76 See id. at 922.
77 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c) (2, 3) (Michie 1997); COLD. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-
1-1001 (3) (a, b) (West 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534.1(a) (2) (1997).
78 See Frank, supra note 75, at 922.
76 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001
(West 1998); RL GEN. LAws § 12-29-4(a) (1) (1997); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-23 (Michie
1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1) (1998).
"R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-4(a) (1) (1997). The statute further states that the court shall
determine, at time of arraignment, whether the no-contact order shall be extended. See id.
§ 12-29-4 (a) (2).
81 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001(1) (West 1998).
82 See S. D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-10-23 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1)
(1998). In addition, some municipalities have also instituted, either through local legislation or
practice, a mandatory no-contact order policy. See Frank, supra note 75, at 933. One such example
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also impose upon the victim the same "no contact" condition, caus-
ing a split in her family without consideration of, or in opposition
to, her wishes.ss
In contrast, other jurisdictions require the court to evaluate fac-
tors such as past conduct by the defendant, drug or alcohol abuse and
access to weapons before determining whether a no-contact order is
appropriate." The Florida statute requires the State Attorney's office
to investigate the defendant's history, including prior arrests for do-
mestic violence, prior arrests for non-domestic charges and prior in-
junctions for protection filed against the defendant.° This provision
allows the court to consider properly the safety of the victim when
determining pretrial release conditions. 86 New York requires a similar
review of the defendant's history by requiring the courts to make a
considered determination before directing the defendant to stay away
from the home.87 When a statute requires the court to consider factors
such as those above before determining whether a no-contact order
should be issued, the opportunity exists for the victim to express her
wishes.° Of those states that have statutorily instituted criminal protec-
tion orders in domestic violence cases, none have expressly required
courts to solicit or consider the victim's concerns .° Wisconsin, how-
ever, does allow the victim to waive the requirement for a temporary re-
straining order within the first seventy-two hours of the arrest, thereby
restricting the court's discretion in imposing conditions upon the
defendant's release. 90
is the city of San Francisco, where prosecutors automatically request no-contact orders at the
defendant's first appearance, unless the victim specifically indicates she does not want one. See
id. In Washington state, some municipal courts have extended the state law permitting no-contact
orders, requiring that the orders be issued. See LAKEWOOD MUN, Cr. R. 9(1) (In all cases where
an individual is arrested on a domestic violence or domestic violence related charge, . . . there
shall be imposed a No Contact Order as a condition of release."); see also YAKIMA MUN. Cr. R.
3.2 ("except at the time of arraignment, bail shall not be set for persons arrested for more than
one count involving domestic violence or a new offense involving domestic violence when the
person has been convicted of domestic violence or is awaiting trial or other disposition of any
other charge involving domestic violence.")
83 See Frank, supra note 75, at 931-32.
84 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (1997); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 530.12 (McKinney 1997);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711 (West 1997).
85 See FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(3) (1997) .
86 See id.
81 See N.Y. CRIM. Paoc. Law § 530.12(1)(a) (McKinney 1997).
" See Frank, supra note 75, at 941.
" See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (Michie 1997); Coto, REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001
(West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901 (West 1997); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 530.12 (McKinney
1997); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711 (West 1997); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-4(a) (1) (1997); S.
D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-23 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1) (1998).
9° See WIS. STAT. § 968.075(5)(c)-(6) (1999).
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Unlike the civil protection order, which is always sought by a
specific petitioner, usually the victim, a criminal protection order does
not require a specific petitioner.9' Civil protection orders require a
petitioner as a procedural safeguard, assuring that only interested
parties who have made proper showing of need can restrict the rights
of another." In contrast, most criminal protection orders do not re-
quire that a specific petitioner be named." In some states, the victim's
name will appear as the petitioner only because statutory requirements
allow members of the criminal justice system to file in the victim's
name." The court may even be able to issue, sua sponte, a temporary
protection order.95 By removing the victim as the petitioner, the system
quells the victim's input, leaving the court without the information it
needs to weigh the victim's wishes properly."
Aggressive policies were needed to address the pervasiveness of
domestic violence in American society and the institutionalized non-
interventionist approach of the criminal justice system. 97 The introduc-
tion of mandatory arrest, prosecutorial mandates such as no-drop and
participation policies and mandatory no-contact orders heightened
the awareness of and response to domestic violence crimes within the
justice system." Each of these policies, however, progressively removed
the victim from the decisionmaking process." In doing so, the state's
" See Frank, supra note 75, at 930. A victim of domestic violence can obtain an order of
protection by first petitioning the court ex parte for a temporary order providing emergency
relief. See id.; see also David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 Onto ST. U. 1153, 1191 (1995). Once
the temporary order has been served on the batterer, the victim must attend a hearing and
request that the civil protection order be made semi-permanent. See Zlotnick, supra at 1191-92.
See Frank, supra note 75, at 922, 931.
" See id. at 930.
94 See 725 ILL. COMP, STAT. 5/112A-2(a) (ii) (West 1998) (statute requires State Attorney to
file the petition in the name of crime victim (s)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(A) (1) (Ander-
son 1998) (statute allows the arresting officer, if the victim is unable, to file a motion requesting
a temporary protection order as a condition of pretrial release).
"See Onto Rev. CODE ANN. § 29I9.26(D) (Anderson 1998). This aspect of the Ohio law was
challenged in Ohio ex rel. Mormile n Garfield Heights Mun. Court. See 607 N.E.2d 890, 890-91
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992), appeal dismissed, 602 N.E.2d 249 (Ohio 1992). Although neither the wife
nor the arresting officer requested a no-contact order as a condition on release, the appeals court
upheld the trial court's refusal to remove the condition requiring the husband to vacate the
couple's house. See Mormile, 607 N.E.2d at 891. The couple had repeatedly petitioned, over an
eight-month period, to have the order lifted. See id.
96 See Frank, supra note 75, at 931-32.
97 See generally No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1859-60; Paradox of Hope, supra note 8,
at 1516; Waits, supra note 5, at 267-68.
as See supra notes 16-96 and accompanying text.
99 See Frank, supra note 75, at 922; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1862; Paradox of Hope,
supra note 8, at 1519.
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interest in addressing crimes of domestic violence was enhanced while
the victim's deliberative and decisional autonomy was overlooked.m
II. AUTONOMY RIGHTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
Almost simultaneously with the development of modern domestic
violence statutory and common law, the United States Supreme Court
actively advanced the personal autonomy and privacy rights of indi-
viduals.'°' At the core of individual autonomy is the fundamental right
to make decisions important to one's destiny. 102 The Supreme Court
has found decisions such as whom to marry, whether to conceive a
child, whether to terminate a pregnancy and whether to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment to be constitutionally protected liberty in-
terests.mDeliberative autonomy, as established by the Court's substan-
tive due process decisions, safeguards the privacy of individuals when
deciding matters central to family structure.m The victim of domestic
violence must confront issues and make decisions pivotal to the sur-
vival of her family; these decisions fall within the scope of guarantees
provided by the Court's substantive due process decisions. 1 °5
A series of United States Supreme Court decisions beginning in
1965 defines deliberative autonomy jurisprudence. 106 In 1965, in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court struck down a state law forbid-
ding the use and distribution of contraceptives to married couples.wl
The Court focused on the impact on the marriage relationship rather
than the autonomy of individuals, finding that the sanctity of marriage
lies within a "zone of privacy."wa In 1972, the Court broadened this
100 See infra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
"See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 851 (1992); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 910 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
102 See Christopher J. Keller, Divining the Priest: A Case Comment on Baehr v. Lewin, 12 LAW
& 1NEq. J. 483, 486-87 (1994); see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600; Wade; 410 U.S. at 153.
1°3 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79; Wade, 410 U.S. at 153; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
161
	 Keller, supra note 102, at 487; see generally James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative
Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1995); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 {looking to precedents
which put limits on the state's right to interfere with personal decisions about family life, the
Court found "matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy . . . [to be] central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
105 See Keller, supra note 102, at 486-87; see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600; Wade, 410 U.S. at
153; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 985-86.
I°6 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79; Wade, 410 U.S. at 153; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12;
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
107 see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
1 °8 See id at 485-86.
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holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird, finding that prohibiting the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried as well as married persons interfered
with the individual right to privacy.w° In Griswold, the Supreme Court
focused on the marriage relationship and the privacy it should be
accorded, while in Eisenstadt the focus was upon individual rights
and deliberative autonomy."° The Court in Eisenstadt explained, "[Of
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."'" Because of the historic treatment
of privacy rights within families, this shift in focus from marital privacy
rights to the rights of individUals to make autonomous decisions is par-
ticularly important when considering the autonomy rights of domestic
violence victims.'" A tradition of allowing violence against women,
under the guise of family privacy, has required advocates of domestic
violence reform to dismantle the "zone of privacy" in order to force
the issue into the public sphere.'" The "zone of privacy" concept was,
however, a limited idea of privacy, one focused on the right to keep
matters private rather than the view of privacy which is derived from
an affirmative concept of liberty—a right to independent decisionmak-
11)9 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
110 See id. at 453-54; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485; see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 10, 12. The Court
invalidated a state ban on interracial marriages as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and due process clauses, describing marriage as "one of the 'basic civil rights
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Loving, 388 U.S. at 12, quatingSlcinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Recognizing the freedom to marry as "one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the Court disallowed
interference by the state in a constitutionally protected personal decision. Id. Thus, the Court
encompassed personal decisionmaking within the vital personal rights protected through sub-
stantive due process. See id.; but see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh'g denied, 478
U.S. 1039 (1986) (majority limiting right to privacy to traditional family sphere which does not
extend to homosexual activity). In a challenge to a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, the
Court held that the statute did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals. See Bowers,
478 U.S. at 189-90. Stating that "[n]co connection between family, marriage, or procreation on
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated," the court refused
to extend the deliberative autonomy of previous cases to the present issue. See id. at 191. The
majority defined constitutional privacy solely in terms of keeping the state out of the traditional
sphere of family privacy, protecting only privacy interests. See id. Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion, however, demonstrated a very different understanding of the constitutional right to
privacy, specifically rejecting Justice White's historically-oriented theory. See id. at 203-04 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Blackmun viewed the privacy right as the right of individuals
to autonomy over the most intimate aspects of their lives. See id. at 199-200.
"'Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Court described the marital couple as "an association of
two individuals, each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup." Id.
112 See id. at 453-54; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1869.
"3 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1869.
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ing with respect to personal and intimate aspects of life." 4 The Court
first articulated this second concept of privacy in 1977 in Whalen v. Roe.
In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court upheld a New York
statute requiring state notification of all prescriptions written for cer-
tain drugs."5 The Court found that the release of patients' names to
the state did not violate a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy"
between doctor and patient.n 6Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous
Court in Whalen, distinguished between the different forms of privacy
recognized by the Supreme Court: "[t]he cases sometimes charac-
terized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different
kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." This distinction be-
tween spacial and decisional aspects of privacy is a recognition that the
issues of privacy go beyond mere bodily integrity to include a moral
and intellectual autonomy expressed through personal choice." 8 Thus,
although the domestic violence victim, due to the criminal nature of
the offense committed against her, may not be able to claim a privacy
interest in avoiding public disclosure, her interest in private decision-
making is still protected." 9
In 1973, the Supreme Court further expanded personal and de-
liberative autonomy rights in Roe v. Wade.' 2° The Court found that a
right to privacy is inherent in the liberty interest of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 121 This right "encompass [ed] a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" and restricted state intru-
114 See id. at 1870-71.
115 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591, 606.
116 See id. at 603-04.
117 See id. at 598-600 (internal citations omitted).
118 See Lisa C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 204, 232 (1995).
lig See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600.
1" See 410 U.S. at 153. The Court examined a Texas statute which prohibited procuring an
abortion except when necessary to save the mother's life. See id. at 117-18. Finding that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and privacy rights, the Court also recognized a legitimate
state interest in the mother's health and the protection of viable life. See id. at 164-65. The Court
established a trimester system for determining the extent of the state's interest in the developing
life and the expectant mother's health. See id. The Court determined that prior to the end of
the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left solely to the mother and her physician. See
id. During the second trimester, the state's interest in promoting the mother's health could be
manifested in regulations of abortion procedures. See id. After viability of the unborn child,
somewhere near the end of the second trimester, the state's interest in potential life justifies
proscribing abortion except where the life or health of the mother is at stake. See id.
121 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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sion upon that right.'" The Court, however, limited the right of delib-
erative privacy with regard to abortions, stating that "at some point the
state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and pre-
natal life, become dominant."'" The Court ruled that a woman's right
to privacy when considering an abortion must be measured against the
state's interests, which grows in substantiality and becomes more com-
pelling as the woman's pregnancy progresses to term. 12" Thus, the
Court recognized a constitutional right of decisional privacy, yet not
an absolute right; this right must be balanced against the opposing
interests of the state. 125
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court revis-
ited these issues.'26 The Court examined amendments to Pennsylvania's
abortion statute, reaffirming the essential holding of Roe yet substitut-
ing an undue burden test to evaluate the viability of the fetus for the
trimester scheme introduced in Roe.'" Using the undue burden test,
the Court affirmed the principle of Roe, stating that the "constitutional
protection [of] personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, [and] family relationships" had already been deter-
mined under the law.'" Looking to precedent, the Court found that
"matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy . . . central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," limit the state's right to interfere with personal decisions about
family life. 129 Justice Stevens, writing separately, focused on the rights
of deliberative autonomy.'" Stating that "[d] ecisional autonomy must
limit the State's power to inject into a woman's most personal delib-
erations its own views of what is best . . . it must respect the individual's
freedom to make such judgments," Justice Stevens found that freedom
to decide matters of a personal and private nature was a constitutional
liberty interest's' In spite of the recognition of decisional autonomy
rights, Casey enhanced the state's power to regulate abortions, estab-
' 22 See id.
'" See id. at 154, 155.
124 See id. at 159, 162-63. The Court fixed the end of the first trimester as the point in time
from which the state may regulate abortions. See id. at 163.
'" See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
126 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
127 See id. at 844, 874.
128 Id. at 851.
129 Id.
1 " See id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131 see
 Casey, 505 U.S.  at 915-16.
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lishing an undue burden test as the standard for balancing the state's
interest and the privacy interest of the woman."' Thus, the test for
determining whether autonomy rights are violated requires balancing
the liberty interests at stake against the relevant state interests that are
inconsistent with the individual interest. 133 Therefore, in a domestic
violence case, the state should not interfere with the deliberative auton-
omy of the victim unless the state's interest outweighs that of the
In 1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the United States Supreme Court
enunciated the balancing test used to resolve competing individual and
state interests.'35 The Mathews case questioned whether due process re-
quired a hearing before the termination of federal disability benefits.'"
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that no
"State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."'" The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law . . :1138 Thus, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments prohibit
any state from arbitrarily depriving any person of liberty and impose
upon the courts a duty to balance the conflicting interests.'" The
Court, looking to the Constitution's due process clauses, set out a test
now employed by most courts to determine whether a deprivation
imposed by a state comports with due process guarantees.'4° The court
first must determine whether the private interest that will be affected
by the state's action is constitutionally protected. 141 If the private inter-
est does not meet this threshold requirement, procedural concerns are
not implicated."' If the court deems the private interest at issue to be
132 See id. at 874 ( -Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause.").
133 See id. at 877; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. In deciding whether Missouri state law, requiring
clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes to withdraw life-sustaining support,
violated liberty rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the Court balanced the personal
interest with the interests of the state. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. The Court found that "a State
has more particular interests at stake. The choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision . . . [the State] may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice
through the imposition of heightened evidentiary requirements." Id. at 281.
' 54 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
1 " See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976).
136 See id. at 323.
137 U.S. CoNs-r. amend. XIV, § 1.
138 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1" See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332,334-35.
14° See id. at 334-35.
141 see id.
MR See id.; Frank, supra note 75, at 939.
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constitutionally protected, the court then must balance the remaining
factors: the risk of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of addi-
tional safeguards and the interest of the state government.'" Courts
have employed this test in domestic violence cases when balancing a
personal liberty interest—the property interests of defendants and the
deprivation of those interests when a defendant is ordered to stay away
from his property—with the interests of the state.'" One such case was
Blazel v. Bradley.
In 1988, in Blazel, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin employed the Mathews test to analyze the respec-
tive rights at issue in a domestic violence case where an ex parte civil
protection order had been issued.'" The court recognized that depriv-
ing the defendant of his enjoyment of property, through the use of
civil protection orders, directly implicates a constitutional question.'"
Both the property interests of the defendant and the privacy interests
of the victim are protected under the Constitution, and the criminal
justice system is obligated to provide mechanisms to assess properly
these interests against the state's interests.' 47 Where no-contact orders
are statutorily mandated, deprivation of these rights occurs without
case-by-case consideration by the very terms of the statute.'" In juris-
dictions that do not mandate no-contact orders, consideration of the
apparent property and liberty interests of the defendant in a domestic
violence case may occur, yet the deliberative autonomy of the victim is
often overlooked.'"
An increasing public perception that the rights of crime victims
generally have been overlooked has caused Congress and many state
legislatures to examine the issue of victim's rights. 150 In 1982, a Victim's
Rights Amendment (VRA) to the U.S. Constitution was first proposed.
Although the VRA has changed dramatically since then, it is expected
to be brought before the current Congress for a vote this year." The
VRA, under its current name, the Victims' Bill of Rights Amendment,
143 See Frank, supra note 75, at 939.
144 See Blaze! v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
145 See id
146 See id. The federal district court expressed concern that although Mathews provided a
mechanism for identifying and weighing rights, the case was silent on what specific procedural
protections best addressed those rights.
147 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332, 334-35.
148 See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
148 See id.; Frank, supra note 75, at 940-41.
INSee Jennie L. Caissie, Note, Passing the Victims' Rights Amendment: A Nation's March
Toward a More Perfect Union, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 647, 647, 663 (1998).
151 See id. at 647 n.2, citing PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT
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seeks to balance the status of the victim with the constitutionally pro-
tected status of the accused by providing the following protections to
the victim: (1) the right to be informed of the proceedings; (2) the
right to be heard at crucial stages in the process; (3) the right to
notification upon the release or escape of the defendant; (4) the right
to a final disposition free from unreasonable delay; (5) the right to an
order of restitution from the convicted offender; and (6) the right to
have the victim's safety considered when determining a release from
custody.in Many states have already amended their constitutions to
provide similar protections. 153 Although such constitutional provisions
would seem to accord the domestic violence victim with an opportunity
to speak at bail and sentencing hearings, many of the states that have
amended their constitutions also mandate no-contact orders in domes-
tic violence cases. 154 Statutorily mandatory no-contact orders do not
provide a mechanism or procedure for incorporating the concerns or
wishes of the victim. 155 Thus, it is uncertain to what extent these con-
stitutional provisions will assist domestic violence victims in the future.
III. ANALYSIS
It remains unclear whether the efforts of the last twenty years have
effectively reduced either the pervasiveness or the intractability of
domestic violence within the American family. 156 Data regarding do-
mestic violence is sparse, and the statistics that do exist are difficult to
compare since methodology and definitions vary by jurisdiction.' 57
Some of the available data indicate that progress has been made:
intimate violence incidents against women dropped from 1.1 million
(1982); see also SJ. Res. 44, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (on July 7, 1998, the Senate Judiciary
Committee approved and voted to report to the full Senate a victims' rights amendment embod-
ied in this joint resolution).
153 See S.J. Res. 44, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); Caissie, supra note 150, at 656 & n.63.
153
 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; N.J. CONST. art. 1,1 22; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 23; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the Constitution: Moving from
Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MAav's U. 1053, 1055 &
n.9 (1998) (stating that twenty-nine states amended their constitutions by the end of 1996).
154 Compare, e.g., ALASKA CONST. arL 1, § 24 (according victims with the right to speak at
hearings), and COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16a (providing for victim participation in hearings), with
ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (1997) (providing for the issuance of mandatory no-contact orders),
and COLO. REV'. STAT. § 18-1-1001 (1998) (providing for mandatory no-contact orders in domes-
tic violence cases).
155 See supra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
156
 See generally Paradox of 'Hope, supra note 8, at 1517-18; Mills, supra note 51, at 190;
Ziotnick, supra note 91, at 1158-59.
1" See Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1517-18; No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1864.
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in 1993 to 840,000 in 1996. 158 Although several possible causes for
this decrease have been suggested—the reform of domestic violence
intervention, the general decline in violent crime or possibly the gen-
erational effect of heightened public awareness on the attitudes of
younger women—the cause cannot be determined via empirical data
since the data collection methods used today do not support this
type of analysis.' 59 Although it is clear that reformers have successfully
heightened public awareness of the pervasiveness and severity of do-
mestic violence within our society, one thing remains certain: intimate
violence continues to pose a serious risk to women,' 6°
Furthermore, scholars, practitioners and advocates Istill do not
agree on the cause of violent behavior in batterers or how best to treat
the problem of domestic violence. 161 Efforts to change institutional
actors and their behavior through mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies have not achieved the desired results.'" Other reformers advo-
cate psychological and behavioral approaches and support court man-
dated treatment of batterers.' 63 The effectiveness of these approaches,
as opposed to the traditional approaches of incarceration and proba-
1" See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Characteristics of Crime (visited on
Nov. 17, 1998) Ghttp://www,cdp.usdoj.govibjs/cvict_c.libul>. Crimes of rape, sexual assault,
robbery, aggravated assault and simple assault are included in these statistics, See id. Intimate
violence against men did not vary significantly from 1992 to 1996. See id. From 1976-1996, on
average, the murder rate of women by intimates dropped by 1%. See id.
159
	
Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1517 n.43, 1524-25 (current national collection
methods and resulting studies do not reflect the disposition of the case or the effects of mandated
treatment).
to See id. at 1517 n.43; see also Response from the Criminal justice System, (visited Nov 17, 1998)
littp://home.cybergirl.com/dv/stat/starcrim.html > (based on a 1990 report of the National
Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept of justice, stating that if all domestic violence were reported,
one-third of the incidents would be classified as felony rapes, robberies or aggravated assaults).
161 See Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1511-12, 1513-15; see also Mary E. ASTMS et al.,
Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Under-
standing the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. gay. 115, 136 (1991) (reporting
that victim advocates in Duluth felt that compelling victims to testify had the effect of punishing
the victim for the abuse); Mills, supra note 51, at 183-84 (advocating a more flexible prosecution
strategy, incorporating the victim's needs and personal experiences); Zlotnick, supra note 91, at
1177-78 (proposing an approach geared at keeping victims of domestic violence engaged in the
criminal justice and social support systems by empowering, rather than disempowering, the
victim).
162 See Zlotnick, supra note 91, at 1173 (referencing studies which concluded that short-term
arrests have little deterrent effect on batterers who have too much invested in their abusive
relationship and could provoke additional assaults after release). Mandatory arrests, if not fol-
lowed by swift and certain penalties, only serve to crowd dockets, causing further delay, with weak
cases rather than achieving the desired deterrent effect. See id. at 1175. The available data also
stilt sts that even in jurisdictions supporting mandatory prosecution, most cases still end with
arrest. See Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1520.
163 See Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1526, citing William L. Hart et al., U.S. Dept of
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tion, also remains unclear. 164 While practitioners and advocates wait for
the availability of more empirical data, allowing for the proper evalu-
ation of the various policies developed over the last twenty years, the
autonomy rights of the victim should not be ignored. Working within
the existing framework for domestic violence prosecution, steps can be
taken to protect the victim's substantive due process rights.
One of the first steps is to recognize the domestic violence victim
as an individual affected by unique circumstances and family relation-
ships.'65 Domestic violence crosses socioeconomic boundaries; women
of all classes and races are abused and men of all classes and races
batter.'66 The impact of state intervention, however, can differ by race
and culture particularly where past government action has resulted in
justifiable wariness. 167
 Preserving cultural identity often requires strong
allegiance to the community as a whole, causing women to choose
between fear of rejection or continued violence.' 68 For instance, Afri-
Justice, Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence: Final Report 22-23 (1984) (stating
that "the most successful treatment occurs when mandated by the criminal justice system," the
report encouraged the establishment of treatment programs to address batterers in cases where
the injury to the victim was not serious). The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 also endorsed
treatment programs as a punishment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (1998) ("The court shall provide,
as an explicit condition of a sentence of probation . . . for a domestic violence crime . . . by a
defendant convicted of such an offense for the first time that the defendant attend a public,
private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation program . . . .").
164 See Paradox of Hope, supra note 8, at 1532-33, 1536. Studies monitoring the effectiveness
of treatment programs provide inconclusive and varied results. See id. at 1533. Results suggesting
that recidivism rates are not significantly different between men receiving treatment and those
that have not or have dropped out of treatment programs. See id; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2151, 2167 (1995) (stating that there
is no evidence that counseling reduces the propensity for repeated violence). In addition, victims
are more likely to remain with a batterer receiving counseling thereby increasing the likelihood
of further abuse. See id.
165 Throughout this Note I use feminine references for victims and masculine references for
batterers. Although these references reflect the majority of domestic violence situations, men and
women both have suffered as victims of batterers. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Characteristics of Crime (visited on Nov. 17, 1998) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
cvict_c.htnd> (reporting that in 1996 females were victims in three out of four instances of
intimate murders and 85% of all non-lethal intimate violence). It must also be noted that domestic
violence is not uniquely an issue for heterosexual couples; reported violence in gay and lesbian
relationships occurs with the same statistical frequency found in heterosexual relationships. See
Nancy E. Murphy, Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-sex Domestic Violence,
30 VAL. U. L. REv. 335, 340 (1995). According to studies, 25% of lesbians and 27% of heterosexual
women are abused by their partners. See id. at 340 tr.34. Experts report that the level of violence
within the gay community is the same as that in society at large. See id.
166 See Ruttenberg, supra note 10, at 185; see also Zlotnick, supra note 91, at 1174 n.110
(stating that although domestic abuse is not bound by social or economic definitions, the
deterrence effect of arrest is different on unemployed batterers than on employed batterers).
167 See Ruttenberg, supra note 10, at 186; see also Mills, supra note 51, at 184 (finding that
women may stay in abusive relationships because of cultural pressures).
164 See Mills, supra note 51, at 184.
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can-American women express greater reluctance to solicit intervention
from the state. 169 In the African-American culture, where experience
with the criminal justice system has created a mindset presupposing
governmental coercion, family privacy is highly valued for the shelter
it provides from the state. 17° In addition, African-American women and
Latinas may be ostracized by their communities for contributing to
racial stereotypes when exposing violence suffered at the hands of their
partners.' 71 Likewise, Asian-Pacific women also face cultural pressures
to maintain silence in the face of violence. 172 Similiarly, Orthodox
Jewish women may choose to accept violence rather than offend Jewish
law by seeking a divorce from an abusive spouse.'" In addition, there
are the cultural norms of American society, those which cross racial
and ethnic divisions, such as preservation of family, forgiveness and an
innate trust that the future will produce positive change.
Even though it is impossible to profile the domestic violence
victim, in the rush to criminalize abusive behavior, the criminal jus-
tice system has portrayed domestic violence victims as perpetually bat-
tered women.174 Much media attention has been paid to the Battered
Woman Syndrome defense that depicts domestic violence victims as "a
collection of mental symptoms, motivational deficits, and behavior
abnormalities." This "dysfunctional portrait of battered women" has
created a stereotype accepted by the general public and the legal
community, each failing to discern the subtlety rooted in the victim's
169 See Ruttenberg, supra note 10, at 185.
170 See id. For African-American women, attempts at resolving domestic violence solely
through the criminal justice system typically ignores their concerns about racial oppression
historically experienced through that system. See id. at 178. When race and gender are analyzed
in the context of domestic violence, white women see gender as the principal source of oppression
while African-American women point to race as the principal source of oppression. See id. at 183.
171 See Mills, supra note 51, at 184. Women from ethnic minorities are reluctant to report
abuse by men of like cultures because they are aware of the continued oppression of their race,
the racist perception that is reinforced by violent incidents and the readiness of the outside society
to label or blame these acts of violence as racially predictable. See id.
172 See id
1" See Beverly Horsborough, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish Commu-
nity, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 177-78 (1995).
174 See Mills, supra note 51, at 185 (stating that mandatory arrest and prosecution policies
are designed to fit a stereotypical battered woman); No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1879
(acknowledging the stereotype of battered women as incapable of self-control, emotionally fragile
and less rational than men); Wills, supra note 41, at 179 (describing battered women as naive
subjects of "master manipulators" as justification for pursuing strong mandatory prosecution
policies, without regard to the concerns of the victim).
115 SeeAnne M. Conglin, Excu sing Women, 82 CAL L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (discussing the Battered
Woman Syndrome defense and finding the defense itself fundamentally premised on women's
psychological incapacity to extricate themselves from abusive mates through lawful means).
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ambivalence toward leaving or prosecuting her batterer—presuming
her ambivalence to be a function of her individual weakness and
pathology rather than the ambivalence inherent in her predicament.'"
This commonly held notion of battered women as weak, passive or
even pathological for staying with abusive men has fueled a societal
disbelief and distrust of the victim and her perspicacity.'" As an illus-
tration, it has been suggested that a battered woman's testimony
"should be accorded great deference when [the victim] wants the law
to take action against the batterer, but should be given less weight when
[the victim] says she wants to protect him."'" Adoption of such a
standard is the antithesis of sound judicial inquiry into the facts of each
case, yet it illustrates the perception of battered women—as weak,
helpless and unstable—in the criminal justice system.'" Arguably, some
battered women, particularly those who routinely have been subjected
to violence, may fit within the battered woman stereotype. The stereo-
type, however, fails to capture the woman at the other end of the
spectrum, the woman who solicits help the first time she encounters
violence. This woman is not suffering from "learned helplessness,"'w
yet her concerns are not differentiated from those of women who have
suffered long-term abuse. Mandatory criminal intervention policies
are most concerned with providing safety through punishment of
perpetrators, and therefore are less attentive to differentiating the
needs of individual domestic violence victims."' The presumption that
all situations involve recurring violence precludes an examination of
the factual conditions of each case and thus is inconsistent with the
constitutional requirements compelling the courts to make case-by-
case determinations.' 82 Although the criminal justice system may be
better prepared to provide state intervention for perpetually abused
1 " See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.C. L. REV. 520, 556 (1992).
177
	 Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a
New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 339, 344 (1995) (finding that commonly held stereotypes of
battered women contributed to negative outcomes in battered women's cases).
175 See Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the
Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. Rev. 267, 307 (1985).
1" See Frank, supra note 75, at 931.
18° See Waits, supra note 178, at 307.
151 See Mills, supra note 51, at 185.
182 See Frank, supra note 75, at 929-25; sew also Zorza, supra note 27, at 67 (reporting that
53% of women plan to reconcile with a batterer-in-treatment but only 19% plan to do so if no
treatment is provided). In addition, the victim is more likely to turn to the criminal justice system
in the future if the system has acted to support her in the past. See id.
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women than it was twenty years ago, it is less able to accommodate the
woman who takes a proactive stance against violence at its onset.
As domestic violence policies have endeavored to remove discre-
tion from the various institutional actors, the victim's control over the
process has been removed. There are several compelling reasons for
shifting the control from the victim to the criminal justice system:
separating the victim from the responsibilities inherent in opting to
pursue the case; reminding the batterer and the public at large that
domestic violence is a crime for which offenders will be held account-
able; and creating an opportunity to educate the victim in her legal
options and other avenues of support. 183 The effect of mandatory
policies, however, may be to strip the victim of any sense of control and
to foster a sense of disempowerment. Excessive use of state power,
particularly forcing the victim to participate in the prosecution, can
result in the revictimization of the victim for the actions of the
abuser.' In taking control of the victim's life, the state substitutes itself
for the abuser as a coercive entity in the victim's life.'" This in turn
may force the victim to align herself with her batterer, because she
prefers a known adversary to an unknown one.'"
Some feminists have noted that state intervention into the lives of
women does not necessarily promote women's equality, safety or well-
being.'" One group of researchers studying the effects of manda-
tory prosecution hypothesized that victims who chose not to drop the
charges in a drop-permitted jurisdiction were the most likely to expe-
rience increased safety due to the victim's "personal power." 188
 The
victim, in making choices regarding prosecution or asserting her right
to be heard, takes an affirmative step toward stopping the violence in
her life.'"
1 " See Mills, supra note 51, at 173, 174, 181.
1" See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1865; see also Annus et al., supra note 161, at 136
(noting that domestic violence advocates in Minnesota felt that compelling victims to testify had
the effect of punishing the victim for the abuse).
185 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1865-66; Mills, supra note 51, at 191.
1 " See Mills, supra note 51, at 190-91.
187 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1871; see also Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique
of The' Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1140-41 (1993) (arguing that
censoring pornography with the rationale that such censorship protects women is paternalistic,
sexist and disempowering).
188 David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process,
Problems and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATIONS
127, 157 (N. Zoe 1-liton ed., 1993). They suggest that the power is derived from three sources:
using the prosecution as a bargaining chip with the batterer, providing women with a means of
allying with others including the police, prosecutors, and judges, and providing women a voice
in determining sanctions against batterers. See id.
1 " See Mills, supra note 51, at 191.
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State intervention, particularly policies that mandate victim par-
ticipation or no-contact orders, is premised upon a presumption that
the state knows what is right for all women.'" These policies effectively
tell the victim that her input is unnecessary, or even unworthy of
consideration, in determining what has occurred and what is best for
her family. If state controls over family relations are increased without
a counterbalancing policy to preserve autonomy interests, the patriar-
chy from which feminists struggle to free themselves only becomes
stronger."' The paternalistic attitudes with which the courts have tra-
ditionally approached domestic violence victims is an impediment to
the free choice and empowerment of women.
In addition, as evidenced by the pursuit of a Victim's Rights
Amendment to the Constitution and the adoption of similar amend-
ments by more than half of the states, tolerance for the usurpation of
the victim's voice in criminal proceedings is diminishing. 192 The sup-
porters of these amendments see the rights at issue—those of the crime
victim to be protected from further victimization by the criminal justice
process—as basic human rights that any civilized system of justice
should protect.'" The violation of these rights is not at the hands of
the accused, but rather at the hands of the government authorities
charged with the duty to prosecute. 194 This is particularly true when
the system is predisposed to consider the victim, such as the domestic
violence victim, because of the nature of the crime and stereotypes
associated with the crime, to be irrational and incapable of making a
reasoned decision regarding the accused's release.
It is important to bear in mind that the victim of crime is not a
party to the criminal prosecution—only the state and the accused stand
as parties. As an alienated third party to the criminal proceedings, the
victim and her rights are easily overlooked.'" The Constitution does
not specifically guarantee crime victims particular rights. 196 At the time
of the Constitution's creation, private prosecution was the means of
198 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1855-56; see also Ruttenberg, supra note 10, at 188
(suggesting that mandatory arrest policies benefit white women while imposing negative conse-
quences on the African-American community).
191
 See generally No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1868-82.
192 See generally Mosteller, supra note 153, at 1053; Caissie, supra note 150, at 647; Laurence
Tribe, The Amendment Could Protect Basic Human Rights, HARP. LAW BMA., Summer 1997, at 19.
193 See Tribe, supra note 192, at 20 (stating that "[plursuing and punishing criminals makes
little sense unless society does so in a manner that fully respects the rights of their victims to be
accorded dignity and respect, to be treated fairly in all relevant proceedings, and to be assured
a meaningful opportunity to observe, and take part in, all such proceedings.").
194 See id.
193 See Caissie, supra note 150, at 655.
198 See generally U.S. CONST. amends. 1-XXVI.
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enforcing the criminal law, with the victim typically serving as both
prosecutor and punisher. 197 Thus, the Framers likely presumed that
victim's rights would be protected by the role the victim played in the
prosecutorial scheme.' 98 Public prosecutors replaced victims as the
initiator of criminal investigation, providing a neutral participant, dis-
tant from the parties and facts of the particular case.'" Gradually
displacing the belief that the wrong was done first to the victim and
then to the state, public prosecution on behalf of the state became the
norm and victim's rights, formerly secured by the victim's role in the
prosecution, were left unprotected.'" Under the VRA, victims would
be guaranteed a right to be heard at the bail and sentencing hear-
ings.291 No-contact orders could not be considered without the victim
expressing her needs. The domestic violence victim, however, does not
need to wait for a constitutional amendment because, unlike other
crime victims and their families where the motivation lies primarily in
retribution, the domestic violence victim can assert rights already con-
stitutionally recognized—the right to decisional autonomy regarding
her family structure.
Another step in protecting the victim's autonomy rights is re-ex-
amining the concept of "privacy" in relation to domestic violence.
Making public what was traditionally considered a private crime was
an essential step in addressing domestic violence."' Family privacy
myths, previously used to support nonintervention into "family mat-
ters" and ignoring domestic violence, also disregarded the societal
harms caused by such violence.203 The criminalization of domestic
violence has been the predominant device for correcting the histori-
cal, legal and moral disparities in the legal protections afforded to
women.'" The resultant policies, particularly those mandating arrest,
no-contact orders and prosecution, however, do not provide an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the legitimate privacy interests of the victim. Having
successfully criminalized the behavior of batterers, it is time to recog-
nize that the "privacy" arguments which sheltered this behavior are
distinct from the privacy issues of victims, particularly their deliberative
lo See Caissie, supra note 150, at 651,661.
198 See id.; see also Tribe, supra note 192, at 20 (noting that the Framers undoubtedly assumed
victim's rights would be protected).
199 See Caissie, supra note 150, at 652-53.
2D° See id. at 662.
291 See SJ. Res. 44, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); Caissie, supra note 150, at 657.
202 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1869,
203 See Wilts, supra note 41, at 174.
204 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1869-70.
964	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 40:937
autonomy in determining the future of their family structure and their
role in criminal proceedings."' While the "zone of privacy" articulated
in Griswold stemmed from the concept that private matters within a
marriage should be left undisclosed and unexamined—thereby serving
to protect a domestic abuser—the modern view of privacy is derived
from an affirmative concept of liberty, one which focuses on moral and
intellectual autonomy."
Privacy, if not confined to its historical concept—a domestic
sphere where men are left alone to oppress women—can further
women's equality and freedom." Some feminist work on domestic
violence argues that protecting the privacy of the family structure is
not a justification for nonintervention in domestic violence cases."
The issue, however, is not whether there should be intervention but
rather to what extent the conflicting interests of the victim should
be balanced against the state's interest in implementing a particular
choice of intervention. Constitutional privacy doctrine does not pro-
tect autonomy absolutely; it does not protect a person's right to make
any choice." It does, however, protect individuals from government
interference with things that "are so important to [our] identity as
persons—as human beings—that they must remain inviolable, at least
as against the state. " 21° Therefore, if the state's choice of intervention
by its very definition precludes examination of the factual conditions—
mandatory no-contact policies as opposed to more discretionary poli-
cies—thereby precluding the protected privacy interests of the victim,
the chosen intervention is inconsistent with the constitutional balanc-
ing requirement.
Perhaps the best place to begin the task of reintroducing the
domestic violence victim's voice to the criminal justice process is in the
realm of the criminal no-contact order. Undoubtedly, the victim is
intensely concerned with and should be intricately involved with any
decision determining the release of her domestic partner. For some
loSee generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 851 (1992); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
2°6 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600 (citations omitted); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965).
2°7 See Laura W. Stein, Living with the Risk of Backfire: A Response to the Feminist Critiques of
Privacy and Equality, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1153, 1173-74 (1993).
208 See No Right to Choose, supra note 5, at 1869.
909 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-75; Stein, supra note 207, at 1173-74; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 279.
21° See Stein, supra note 207, at 1173 (quoting Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 737, 753 (1989)).
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women, the imminent release of their abuser signals a return to vio-
lence, perhaps even retaliatory violence for calling the police in the
first place."' For others, an always tenuous peace may ensue with the
woman managing the violence through persuasion. 212 For the more
fortunate, the abuse will end either because a single incident is enough
for the victim to abandon the relationship or for the batterer to seek
the help he needs to control his abusive behavior. Regardless, any of
these women have a significant interest in being heard. Some women
will demand that their abusers be held while many others will argue
for release.2" In either case, the decision is not made lightly. Women
typically consider the needs of their children, their financial prospects
for surviving without their partners, whether they can safely separate
from violent partners and their need to maintain a relationship with
the men they love. 214 Whatever decision a woman makes is a constitu-
tionally protected decision which must be weighed against the interests
of the state.
At the time when a no-contact order is issued, the state's interest
appears to be less significant than at any other point in the criminal
process. The state is prepared to release the accused batterer back into
the community,'" presumably after some period of detention.'" The
prosecutor and, in many states, social services or victims' advocates,
may have had an opportunity to counsel the victim on the risks of
repeated violence. The state's interest in arrest has been satisfied and
its interest in prosecution is also protected. 217 Thus, if one applies the
Mathews balancing test, the interests of the state when compared to
the autonomy interests of the victim appear to be less substantial at the
time of issuance of a no-contact order than at other points along the
prosecution timeline.'" Moreover, the court considering the issuance
211 See wills, supra note 41, at 180.
212 See id,
213 See id. at 177 (noting that a domestic violence victim's refusal to press charges is the norm
in domestic violence prosecutions).
214 See Schneider, supra note 176, at 558. Most battered women want the relationship to
continue but the battering to stop. See id.
212 See Frank, supra note 75, at 924-25. The power of the criminal courts to set bail is well
established, See id. at 925. The general right to bail, except in the most serious cases, is derived
from the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 928. Moreover, most states have codified the right to bail
within their constitutions. See id.
216 See Schulhofer, supra note 164, at 2166 (citing a study of mandatory arrest policies,
Schulhofer points out that the average dine in custody varied from two to twenty-four hours).
211 See generally Frank, supra note 75. The no-contact order is issued as a condition upon
pretrial release, which in turn is provided only upon assurance of the accused, in the form of
bail, that he will be available upon demand of the court. See id.
218 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 594-35 (1976).
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of a criminal protection order should remain attentive to the protected
liberties at stake—the property interests of the criminal defendant and
autonomy interests of the victim. 219 Inquiry into the constitutionally
protected rights at stake, particularly before the batterer is excluded
from his residence, is best ensured by requiring a factual investigation
and balancing of interests.2" This, of course, is impossible in states
where the statutes governing pretrial release of domestic violence
defendants mandate or fail to require meaningful review. 22 I
Procedural protection, designed to facilitate the informed consid-
eration of the rights at stake in a particular case, is often dispensed with
when statutes mandate the issuance of criminal no-contact orders. 222
In these situations, courts may fail to make factual inquiries into the
concerns of the domestic violence victim—financial, property, emo-
tional—and thus, effectively silence her voice. 223 Therefore, in order
for the autonomy rights of the victim and, for that matter, the liberty
and property rights of the accused to be properly considered, legisla-
tion should be amended to require adherence to procedural due
process. Such procedural requirements facilitate the judicial considera-
tion of the rights at stake in each case. 224 Lawmakers can provide for
procedures that allow all interests to be heard—the victim's, the defen-
dant's and the State's—thus ensuring a reasoned decision on a case-
by-case basis. 225
Finally, because all states and the District of Columbia provide
means for a domestic violence victim to petition the court for protec-
tion, the civil protection order must be recognized as an alternative
approach to criminal protection orders. 2" Many of the same protec-
tions imposed by criminal protection orders are available through the
civil protection order process. 227 Since relief is already universally avail-
212 See U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
226 See Blaze! v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (finding that restrictions on
access to personal property and residence, due to the issuance of a civil protection order,
implicate constitutional concerns). Applying Mathews, the court found that substantial proce-
dural protections were mandated based on the accused's interest in his home. See id.
"I See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.027 (1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-1001 (West
1998); R.I. GEN. Laws § 12-29-4(a)(1) (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-23 (Michie 1998);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.5(1) (1998).
42 See Frank, supra note 75, at 939-40.
223 See id.
224 See id.
226 See id. at 941.
226 See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 FIOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 842-43 (1993).
221 See Frank, supra note 75, at 922.
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able, the state's interests in imposing criminal no-contact orders should
not be given great weight. 228
CONCLUSION
The victim of domestic violence deserves the protection of the
criminal justice system without sacrificing her autonomy rights. Al-
though privacy doctrine has in the past led institutional actors to
ignore domestic violence as a societal concern, public awareness and
reform in the managing of domestic violence cases successfully has
dismantled this misapplication of privacy rights. With this done, it is
time to set aside fears regarding the application of privacy rights in the
domestic violence context in order to allow victims to enjoy their
constitutionally protected rights to decisional autonomy.
The issuance of a criminal no-contact order, in essence, separates
a family, forcing one member out of the home. The emotional and
financial hardships inherent in such an action should not be ignored.
In addition to these concerns, the history of violence, or the lack
thereof, within the relationship needs to be considered. In failing to
allow for victim input in the process of defining the conditions of a
pretrial release, courts ignore the victim's right to determine the struc-
ture of her family. Legislation that mandates no-contact orders by
definition prohibits meaningful review of all of the factors and interests
involved, including the history of the relationship and the wishes of
the victim.
CHRISTINE O'CONNOR
2" See id. at 923.
